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Globalization bears both optimistic and pessimistic views about its effects on the 
economy. According to a trade model in economics, lower tariffs and transportation 
costs should push each country to specialize in producing the goods that the country 
has a comparative advantage in. In principle, globalization should hence lead to an 
increase in the relative demand for skilled labour in rich industrialized countries, and 
an increase in the demand for the unskilled labour in poor developing countries. In 
contrast, a pessimistic view about the effects of globalization stems from that it could 
be a source of increased inequality. While integration with world markets can make a 
significant contribution to the productivity increase and thus economic growth, it may 
be detrimental to equity. Low wages and restricted workers’ rights could be important 
factors to attract foreign investment and gain greater access to the world market, 
which overall tend to benefit capital owners. At the same time, globalization could 
engender more inequality among workers. This can occur if only a small proportion of 
the people who have skills benefit from increased economic integration and the rest 
are left behind. From empirical perspectives on the effects of globalization, the 
available evidence is mixed. The Asian experience over the past two decades suggests 
that globalization has a positive and dramatic impact on both growth and poverty 
reduction. Yet there has been an increase in inequality as observed in China and India. 
Moreover, several studies also suggest that Latin American countries have 
experienced an increase in wage inequality after their economic liberalization. This 
warrants a closer look at the merits of the relationship between globalization, growth, 
poverty, and inequality.  
The Brazilian experience has been quite peculiar in the sense that structural reforms, 
and in particular trade liberalization, started comparatively late, only a few years ago. 
Whereas other countries in Latin America started opening their economies in the early 
or mid-1980s, the same process started in Brazil only in the early 1990s. As is 
generally claimed, there is a strong association between growth and poverty reduction 
in Brazil. Whether growth translates into significant poverty reduction depends upon 
numerous factors such as education, unemployment, minimum wages, social 
programmes, etc. One of the most important factors influenced by all others is the 
degree of inequality in the country. High inequality in the country would have 
prevented the economy from growing faster. It is imperative to emphasize that a 
combination of economic growth and income distribution would lead to a more rapid 
and effective solution to poverty reduction. Studies have found that poverty is more 
responsive to growth when the distribution of income and assets is more equal. In this 
context, a more equal society will grow faster. Brazil has been notoriously known as 
one of the countries with the highest income inequality in the world (Li et al., 1998; 
Psacharopoulos, 1991). After its steep rise in the 1960s, Brazilian income inequality 
has been high and stable between 1970 and 2000 (Langoni, 1973; Bacha and Taylor, 
1978; Hoffman, 1989; Bonelli and Sedlacek, 1989, Barros and Camargo, 1992; 
Ramos, 1993; Barros et al., 2000). In recent years, however, inequality has been on 
the decline with a pace comparable to the rise observed in the 1960s. This change 
reflects a combination of labour market improvements seen by low skilled workers, 




targeted official income policies. But what are the share of these factors on the 
observed trends?  
This paper analyses the relationship between growth patterns, poverty and inequality 
in Brazil during its globalization process, focusing on the role played by the labour 
market and social programmes. From a methodological point of view, the paper 
makes two contributions to the literature. One contribution is the proposal of a new 
measure of pro-poor growth, which links growth rates in mean income and in income 
inequality. The other contribution is a decomposition methodology that explores 
linkages between three dimensions: growth patterns, labour market performances, and 
social policies. The proposed methodologies are then applied to the Brazilian National 
Household Survey (PNAD) covering the period 1995–2004.  
This paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 is devoted to the 
derivation of pro-poor growth rate that adjusts for inequality. Section 3 outlines 
empirical aspects of calculating the pro-poor growth rate using household surveys. 
Section 4 develops a decomposition methodology to link pro-poor growth with labour 
market characteristics, while Section 5 describes trends in growth, inequality, and 
poverty in Brazil. Sections 6 and 7 present the empirical results for pro-poor growth 
rates and the decomposition method applied to labour market ingredients, 
respectively. Based on a Shapley decomposition, Section 8 looks at the contribution 
of main components to growth patterns. Similarly, Section 9 investigates the 
contributions of different non-labour income sources to growth. Section 10 concludes 
the study. 
2  Pro-poor growth rate 
Suppose x is the real income of an individual, which is a random variable with density 





) ( dx x xf μ      (1) 
A country’s performance in average standard of living can be measured by the growth 
rate γ  given by 
) (μ γ Ln Δ =      (2) 
Economic growth has an impact on each individual in a different manner. Following 
Kakwani and Pernia (2000), growth is defined as pro-poor (or anti-poor) if the poor 
benefit proportionally more (or less) than the non-poor, i.e., growth results in a 
                                                 
1  The real income is the nominal income adjusted for prices. The prices can vary across regions 
and over time. The determination of real income will depend on both regional price indices and 
consumer prices indices, which vary over time.  




redistribution of income in favour of the poor. When there is a negative growth rate, 
growth is defined as pro-poor (anti-poor) if the loss from growth is proportionally less 
(more) for the poor than for the non-poor. This is a relative concept of pro-poor (anti-
poor) growth because growth leads to a reduction (or increase) in relative inequality.2  
The pattern of growth can be described by two factors: (i) the growth rate in mean 
income defined by γ  and (ii) how inequality changes over time. To measure the 
pattern of growth, we need to specify a social welfare function, which gives a greater 
weight to utility enjoyed by the poor compared to utility enjoyed by the non-poor.3 
Suppose u(x) is the utility function, which is increasing in x and concave, then we can 





dx x f x w x u W      (3) 
where w(x) is the weight given to the utility of the individual with income x. The main 
problem with this social welfare function is that it is not invariant to the positive 
linear transformation of the utility function. Following Atkinson’s (1970) idea of 
equally distributed equivalent level of income, we can get a money-metric social 
welfare function denoted by x





dx x f x w x u x u W
*          ( 4 )  
where x
* is the equally distributed equivalent level of income which, if given to every 
individual in the society, results in the same social welfare level as the actual 
distribution of income. Note that if  1 ) ( = x w  for all x, then x
* in (4) is identical to the 
money-metric social welfare proposed by Atkinson (1970).  
To make pro-poor growth operational, we need to specify u(x) and w(x). The most 
popular form of the utility function is the logarithmic utility function which, given by 
u(x) = log(x), is increasing and concave in x. In this study, we adopt the logarithmic 
                                                 
2  Pro-poor growth can also be defined in a stronger absolute sense: growth is pro-poor if the poor 
enjoy greater absolute benefits than the non-poor. When growth is negative, growth is absolute pro-
poor if the absolute loss from growth is less for the poor than for the non-poor. Absolute pro-poor 
(anti-poor) growth reduces (increases) absolute inequality. See Grosse et al. (2008) and Kakwani 
and Son (2008) for a detailed discussion of absolute pro-poor growth, see. In this paper, our focus 
will be on relative pro-poor growth.  
3  One can also measure the pattern of growth by means of poverty measures instead of a social 
welfare function. Kakwani and Son (2008) have used the entire class of additive decomposable 
poverty measures to describe the pattern of growth. Ravallion and Chen (2003) focused on a 
particular member of this class, i.e., the Watts poverty measure. Thus, the proposed measure of pro-
poor growth does not require a poverty line; it is a distribution-weighted growth measure where 




utility function not only because of its popularity, but also because of its attractive 
features such as the decomposability of growth rate in terms of some labour force 
characteristics (see next Section). Atkinson (1970) specified u(x) by an entire class of 
homothetic functions, which provide flexibility to choose any value of inequality 
aversion parameter. By choosing a logarithmic function, we have chosen the 
inequality aversion parameter to be equal to 1. 
The inequality aversion parameter determines how much weight should be given to 
the poor relative to the non-poor; the higher the inequality aversion parameter, the 
greater is the weight given to the poor relative to the non-poor. Since Brazil has 
persistently suffered high degree of inequality, it is our opinion that we should choose 
the inequality aversion parameter to be higher than what is implied by the logarithmic 
utility function. We can achieve this objective by choosing w(x), which is a 
decreasing function of x so that the total weight given to all individuals add up to 
unity, which implies 
0
()() 1 wxf xd x
∞
= ∫      (5) 
According to Sen (1974), the weighting function w(x) can capture the relative 
deprivation suffered by the poor relative to the non-poor in society. Following him, a 
simple way to capture relative deprivation is to assume that an individual’s 
deprivation depends on the number of persons who are better off than him/her in 
society. Such a weighting scheme is given by  
() 2 [ 1 () ] wx Fx =−      (6) 
where  F(x) is the distribution function. This function implies that the relative 
deprivation suffered by an individual with income x is proportional to the proportion 
of individuals who are richer than this individual. It can be verified that w(x) in (6) is 
a decreasing function of x and satisfies equation (5).4 
Substituting u(x) = log(x) and w(x) from (6) in (4) gives the social welfare function 




1 2 dx x f x log x F x log
*      (7) 
which provides the basis for the empirical analysis presented in this paper. If we 
substitute u(x)=x in (7), we would obtain a social welfare function developed by Sen 
(1974)  
) 1 ( G W − = μ      (8) 
                                                 
4  Note that this weighting scheme is also implicit in the Gini index, which is the most popular 




where G is the Gini index. This social welfare function has been criticized on the 
ground that it is not strictly quasi-concave.5 It can be demonstrated that our proposed 
social welfare function in (7) is indeed strictly quasi-concave. This is not the only 
reason for using the proposed social welfare function. Sen’s social welfare function 
cannot be used to directly link the growth pattern with the changes in labour force 
characteristics, which is an important contribution of this paper.6  
It will be useful to write (7) as  
( ) () ( ) I log log x log
* − = μ      (9) 
where  
0
log( ) 2 [1 ( )][log( ) log( )] ( ) I Fx x fxd x μ
∞
=− − ∫         (10) 
where I is a new measure of inequality. Taking the difference in (9) gives  
* g γγ = −      (11) 
where  ( )
* * x log Δ = γ  is the growth rate of money-metric social welfare x
*, 
log( ) γ μ =Δ  is the growth rate of mean income μ  and  log( ) gI = Δ is the growth rate 
of inequality as measured by I. This equation describes a growth pattern which 
provides the linkage between growth rates in the mean income and income inequality.  
* γ  is the proposed measure of the pro-poor growth rate. If g is positive, then growth is 
accompanied by an increase in inequality. In this case, we have  γ γ <
*  and thus, there 
is a loss of growth rate due to the increase in inequality. If g is negative, this implies 
that growth is accompanied by a decrease in inequality, in which case, γ γ >
* , which 
suggests that there is a gain in growth rate due to the decrease in inequality. Growth is 
defined as pro-poor (or anti-poor) if there is a gain (or loss) in growth rate. Thus, a 
change in inequality is captured by the gain and loss in growth rate.  
It is interesting to note that the proposed pro-poor growth rate 
* γ for Atkinson’s 
(1970) money-metric social welfare (when inequality aversion parameter is equal to 
1) is obtained as 
                                                 
5  See Dasgupta et al. (1973) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1973). 
6  The idea of calculating growth rates of money metric-social welfare is not new. Klasen (1994) has 
analysed US post-war economic performance based on growth rates calculated from Sen’s (1974) 
and Dagum’s (1990) social welfare functions. Kakwani (1981) and Gruen and Klasen (2008) have 
used Sen’s (1974) social welfare function to compare welfare across countries. In this study we 
could not utilize Sen’s social welfare function because it did not provide a linkage of pattern of 
growth with the changes in labour force characteristics. Our proposed social welfare function has 








* ) ( ) ( dx x f x g γ      (12) 
where ) log( ) ( x x g Δ =  is the growth rate enjoyed by a person with income x. This 
equation implies that the growth rate of every person receives the same weight. This 
is in fact the Ahluwalia and Chenery’s (1974) equal weight index. Note that the 
growth rate of mean income γ gives exactly the same weight to a dollar increase in 
income of every recipient but 
* γ in (12) gives exactly the same weight to a 1 per cent 
increase in income of everyone. Thus, the Ahluwalia and Chenery index gives greater 
weight to the increases in income of poorer persons than those of richer persons.7  
The idea of equal proportional weight is interesting but given the persistent high 
inequality in Brazil, we may wish to give greater weight to growth rates of poorer 
persons than those of richer persons. Our proposed growth rate 
* γ  in (11) meets this 
requirement: the weight given to growth rates declines monotonically with the income 
level.  
3  Calculating pro-poor growth rate from household surveys 
This study utilizes the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios (PNAD, the 
Brazilian Annual National Household Survey) from 1995 to 2004. Each household 
survey contains a variable called the weighting coefficient (WTA), which is the 
number of population households represented by each sample household. The sum of 
the WTAs for all sample households provides the total number of households in the 
country. A population weight variable (POP) can be constructed by multiplying the 
weighting coefficient (WTA) by the household size. The sum total of the (POP) 
variable for all sample households provides an estimate of the total population in the 
country. The total population estimate for Brazil was calculated as equal to 148.11 
million for 1995, which increased to 173.71 million in 2004.  
Using the (POP) variable, one can easily calculate the relative frequency that is 
associated with every sample household. Suppose fjt is the relative frequency 
associated with the jth household at year t. If xjt is the per capita real income of the jth 
household at year t, then the mean income of all individuals in the country at year t 






jt jt t x f
1
μ      (13) 
which was estimated for every year between 1995 and 2004. We then estimate the 
growth rate of the mean income at year t as 
                                                 




log( ) tt γ μ = Δ      (14) 
To compute the social welfare function defined in (7), we need an estimate of the 
probability distribution function F(x). An unbiased estimate of F(x) for the jth 






jt it jt / f f p
1
2     (15) 
when households are arranged in ascending order of their per capita real income  it x . 
Substituting (15) into (7) gives a consistent estimate of money-metric social welfare 
*
t x  as given by  







t x log p f x log
1
1 2      (16) 
which gives an estimate of the pro-poor growth rate at year t as 
** log( ) tt x γ =Δ      (17) 
Growth will be pro-poor (or anti-poor) at year t if 
*
t γ is greater (or less) than t γ . 
4  Linking pro-poor growth with labour force characteristics 
The PNAD provides labour force characteristics of individuals. From the individual 
information, we can calculate the following variables at the household level: 
–  Per capita real labour income ( l y ) 
–  Per capita non-labour income ( nl y ) 
–  Per capita employed persons in the household (e) 
–  Per capita labour force participation rate (l) 
–  Per capita hours of work in the labour market (h) 
–  Per capita years of schooling in the household (s) 
Using these variables, we calculate the following variables of interest:9 
                                                 
8  This equation makes a continuity correction, which is estimated by obtaining an unbiased estimate 
of F(x). 
9  Productivity is defined here as labour earning per hour of work. This is a restricted definition and is 




–  Employment rate:  l / e er =  
–  Hours worked per employed person:  / e hh e =  
–  Productivity:  h yl / = ξ  
The linkage between the growth rate of per capita labour income and growth rates of 
the four labour force characteristics (which include employment, hours of work per 
employed person, labour force participation rate, and productivity) is provided 
through the following identity 
() () ( ) ( ) ( ) ξ ln ln h ln e ln y ln e r l + + + = l      (18) 
Using this definition, it is easy to show that growth rate in per capita labour income is 
related to growth rates of the four labour force characteristics in an additive fashion 
() () () ( ) ( ) ξ γ γ γ γ γ + + + = l e r l h e y      (19) 
The first factor is the employment rate. If this factor is positive, this suggests that the 
employment rate has improved in the economy, contributing positively to economic 
growth. A similar interpretation can be given to the other factors. The last factor is the 
contribution of change in productivity to the growth rate of per capita labour income.  
Again using the identity (18) in (16), it is easy to show that the pro-poor growth rate 
of per capita labour income is also related with pro-poor growth rates of the same four 
labour market characteristics in an additive fashion as10  







* h e y + + + = l      (20) 
Subtracting (19) from (20) gives the decomposition of the growth rate of inequality in 
total income in terms of four factors as  







* g g h g e g y g + + + = l      (21) 
The growth rate of labour income is pro-poor (or anti-poor) if  ( ) l
* y g  is greater (or 
less) than 0. This equation provides the contributions of various labour force 
characteristics to a gain (or loss) of growth rate due to changes in the pattern of per 
capita labour income.11 If, for instance,  ( ) r
* e g  is positive (or negative), it means that 
                                                                                                                                            
product. Although this assumption is not strictly valid, the workers with higher productivity tend to 
have higher hourly wage rates. Thus, the hourly earnings can be used as proxy for productivity. 
Moreover, since our purpose is to evaluate the standards of living of households, this restricted 
definition is more relevant because it is directly related to households’ standard of living.  
10  Note that the pro-poorness of labour income is measured with respect to the total per capita income. 
11 A gain in growth rate implies a decrease in inequality and a loss in growth rate indicates an increase 




employment generated in the economy contributes to a decrease (or increase) in 
inequality in per capita income. A similar interpretation applies to the other factors. 
Schooling is a major factor that has an impact on productivity. It is generally true that 
the higher the level of schooling an individual possesses, the greater is his/her 
productivity (or labour earnings per hour). Thus, an increase in years of schooling 
should lead to an increase in productivity. But the relationship between schooling and 
productivity is not that simple. Changes in years of schooling are also accompanied 
by changes in returns from schooling. The returns from schooling also vary from one 
household to another depending on a host of factors such as age, location, occupation, 
and so on. Growth rates of returns are also not uniform across households.  
Productivity of the jth household denoted by 
j ξ  can be written as  
j j
l
j h / y = ξ      (22) 
where 
j
l y  is the per capita labour income of the jth household and 
j h is the per capita 
hours of work in the labour market provided by the jth household. Suppose r  is the 
average hourly return from per year of schooling of all the working population and 
j r  is the average return (per hour) from per year of schooling of the jth household. 
Then the productivity of the jth household can be written as  
( ) r / r r s
j j j = ξ        (23) 
where  
j j j s / r ξ =      (24) 
Taking the logarithm in both sides of equation (23), we obtain 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) r / r log r log s log log
j j j + + = ξ      (25) 
which on utilizing the averages of the variables and taking first differences gives 
() () () sr γ ξγ γ =+     (26) 
which shows that the growth rate in the mean productivity can be decomposed into 
two components. The first component is the growth rate of mean years of schooling, 
and the second is the growth rate of average returns from per year of schooling.12 
Applying the identity (25) in (16), it can be easily shown that the pro-poor growth rate 
of productivity is related to three factors in an additive fashion as  
                                                 
12  Changes in relative rates of returns from schooling do not affect the growth rate of productivity but 




( )( )() ( ) r / r r s
j * * * * γ γ γ ξ γ + + =      (27) 
Subtracting (26) from (27) gives the decomposition of the growth rate of inequality in 
productivity in terms of three factors  
( )( )( ) ( ) r / r g r g s g g
j * * * * + + = ξ      (28) 
The first term on the right hand side of (28) relates to how growth in years of 
schooling is distributed among the poor and the non-poor. The schooling will be pro-
poor (or anti-poor) if g
*(s) is greater (or less) than zero. The second term in (28) will 
always be zero, because r is the same for all households. The third term measures the 
impact of the redistribution of the rates of returns among households. If  ( ) r r g
j /
*  is 
greater (or less) than 0, changes in the rates of returns from schooling favour poor (or 
non-poor) households more than non-poor (or poor) households. This decomposition 
is useful in understanding the impact of schooling on growth and inequality. 
5  Macroeconomic and poverty trends 
5.1   Macroeconomic background 
Brazil experienced some of the world’s highest inflation rates over the period from 
1960 to 1995. From at least the beginning of the 1980s, curbing inflation became the 
focus of public policy in Brazil. Successive macroeconomic packages and three major 
stabilization efforts have been attempted since then: the Cruzado Plan in 1986, the 
Collor Plan in 1990, and the Real Plan in 1994. The Real Plan was based on an 
‘exchange-rate-based stabilization’ model that led to consumption booms instead of 
recessions. But the need to support an overvalued exchange rate for stabilization 
purposes increased the fragility of the Brazilian economy, making it vulnerable to 
external shocks such as the Mexican (1995), Asian (1997), and Russian (1998) crises. 
The 1999 Brazilian devaluation crisis triggered important changes in macroeconomic 
policy that can be still observed today, including (1) the adoption of floating exchange 
rates; (2) the adoption of inflation targets; and (3) the implementation of the Fiscal 
Responsibility Law, which is binding on all government levels and state enterprises 
alike but has increased the size of the tax burden by about 10 percentage points of 
GDP from 1995 onward, reaching around 37 per cent at the end of 2008. One also has 
to bear in mind that there were very high real interest rates and an expansion of public 
expenditures that contributed both to the rise in Brazil’s public debt, which reached 
more than 50 per cent of GDP, and also to the slow growth trend assumed. During the 
2002 elections, Brazil faced another crisis, which was controlled by the new 
government in the following year. This was done by means of a so-called confidence 
shock, which meant keeping the country’s previous directions for macroeconomic 
policy. Following a mild recession in 2003, a boom in the global economy and 
improved internal fundamentals isolated the Brazilian economy from adverse external 




5.2   Pro-poor growth and poverty trends 
For this study, we have chosen per capita real income as a welfare indicator. Per 
capita real income is defined as per capita nominal income adjusted for prices, which 
vary across regions and over time. This is achieved by dividing the per capita nominal 
income by the per capita poverty line expressed as a percentage. The poverty line 
used in this paper takes into account regional costs of living (Ferreira et al., 2003; 
Neri, 2001).  
Table 1 presents growth rates of per capita real income and per capita money metric 
social welfare. The results reveal that the trend in per capita real income has been 
declining at an annual rate of 0.63 per cent over 1995–2004. Hence, the actual growth 
rate of per capita real income has been almost stagnant. This unimpressive 
performance in per capita real income worsened even further in the second period 
2001–04, when per capita real income fell at an annual rate of 1.35 per cent.  
This pessimistic picture, however, tends to disappear if growth is evaluated in terms 
of social welfare, which makes an adjustment for inequality, (called the pro-poor 
growth rate in the table.) This is a more relevant concept for evaluating a country’s 
performance in relation to its standard of living. In the first period (1995–2001), the 
trend in the pro-poor growth rate, although positive, was only 0.10 per cent, which 
cannot be regarded as a good performance, but the trend in the growth rate in the 
second period (2001–04) increased to 3.07 per cent, which is an exceptionally good 
performance.  
The last column of Table 1 is obtained by subtracting the actual growth rate from the 
pro-poor growth rate. Gains in growth rates imply a decline in inequality, while losses 
in growth rates imply an increase in inequality. Substantial gains in growth rates are 
quite noticeable in the second period, 2001–04. There were gains in growth rates 
equivalent to 4.42 per cent per annum because of falling inequality in the 2000s. By 
contrast, the gains were merely 0.40 per cent per year in the first period, 1995–2001. 
Thus, in the second period, the poor were able to benefit proportionally much more 
from growth than in the first period. This growth pattern has led to an unprecedented 
reduction in inequality in Brazil (which is evident from Figure1). 
Having examined the trends in growth and inequality, it is interesting to analyse the 
trends in poverty over 1995–2004. Poverty estimates for the headcount ratio, the 
poverty gap ratio and the severity of poverty are presented in Table 2. The results 
show a significant reduction in poverty between 1995 and 1998.  
However, the percentage of poor increased from 27.83 per cent in 1998 to 28.81 per 
cent in 1999, which could be due to the impact of the Asian crisis upon the Brazilian 
economy. Since 1999, poverty had been on the decline. Note that the real minimum 
wage had increased to its highest point during the period 2000–01, 9.1 per cent. It 
appears that raising the minimum wage is an important measure that reduces poverty 
in Brazil as a whole. It should be highlighted, however, that the positive impact of a 
higher minimum wage rate can be reduced with a rising unemployment rate, due to 
higher costs. In Brazil, the annual growth rate of the minimum wage has been 




unemployment rate recently reached almost 10 per cent in 2001 (WDI, 2004). This 
indicates that the positive impact of the increasing minimum wage on poverty 
reduction could have been mitigated by the rising unemployment rate in the 1990s.  
All in all, the Brazilian experience exhibits an interesting pattern between growth in 
per capita real income and poverty: while per capita real income declined over the 
period, poverty also fell. This is an interesting case that does not support a priori the 
notion that a positive (or negative) growth leads to a decrease (or increase) in poverty. 
More importantly, the negative growth during the period, 1995–2004, was pro-poor in 
the sense that the poor made positive gains in their incomes, despite the fact that 
average incomes declined. Thus, there was a sharp decline in inequality over the 
period which offset the adverse effect of the negative growth on poverty. 
6  Patterns of pro-poor growth 
Per capita total income can be derived from both labour and non-labour income 
sources. Table 3 shows growth rates of per capita labour income during 1995–2004. 
Consistent with the growth rate in per capita total income, earnings from the labour 
market did not perform well over the period. Per capita real labour income declined at 
an annual rate of 1.49 per cent between 1995 and 2004. The second period was worse, 
when the growth rate in labour income became -2.05 per cent per annum. However, 
the per capita growth rate in social welfare became positive, with an annual rate of 
0.97 per cent in the second period. Thus, there was gain of 3.02 per cent in growth 
rate, which is attributed to a decline in inequality. This indicates that in the 2000s, the 
labour market conditions improved for the poor relative to the non-poor. Figure 2 
shows that labour income had benefited the poor proportionally more than the non-
poor in the latest period, 2003–04, in particular. It will be interesting to find out which 
factors of the labour market—such as employment and productivity, among others—
played a major role in explaining this pro-poor growth pattern in this period. This task 
is taken in the next section.  
The changes in non-labour income are in sharp contrast with those in labour income. 
The story of non-labour income can be told with the help of Table 4. Per capita non-
labour income grew at an annual rate of 2.64 per cent between 1995 and 2004, the 
growth rate being much slower in the second period.  
In view of the pro-poor growth, the non-labour income performed even better than the 
actual growth. Interestingly, when the non-labour income is adjusted for inequality, 
the growth rate becomes much higher for the second period than for the first period. 
This is suggested by the fact that the annual pro-poor growth rates are 5.20 and 9.14 
per cent for 1995–2001 and 2001–04, respectively. Hence, the growth in non-labour 
income was much more pro-poor in the period of 2001–04. More importantly, the 
high pro-poorness of non-labour income is the factor that underpins the fall in 
inequality during the second period. It can be seen clearly from Figure 3 that the gap 
between the pro-poor growth rate and the actual growth rate widened in the second 




In summary, growth in total income is much more pro-poor in the second period than 
in the first. This is due mainly to the non-labour income that benefited the poor 
proportionally more than the non-poor. Compared to the non-labour income, the pro-
poorness of the labour income was rather small over the period. Figure 4 sums up 
these findings.  
7  Linkages between labour market and pro-poor growth13 
Using the decomposition presented in the paper, this section attempts to explain the 
pro-poor growth in Brazil in terms of the four labour market characteristics, which 
include the labour force participation rate, the employment rate, hours of work per 
employed person, and productivity. The impact of labour productivity is further 
explained by years of schooling and average and relative rates of returns. The 
decomposition results are presented in Tables 5–7.  
The per capita labour income declined at an annual rate of 1.49 per cent in the entire 
period from 1995 to 2004. The employment rate and hours of work contributed to a 
decline in growth rate by 0.34 and 0.25 per cent, respectively. The decline in 
productivity was the major factor that contributed to a decline of growth rate of 1.63 
per cent. Despite the weak labour market, the labour force participation rate increased 
at an annual rate of 0.73 per cent, which made a positive contribution to growth of the 
same magnitude. 
It is also evident that the work force in Brazil is getting more educated. The years of 
schooling of the labour force increased at an annual rate of 2.99 per cent during the 
1995–2004 period, which contributed to an increase in productivity at the same rate 
(2.99 per cent). The expansion of education has been accompanied by a decline in the 
average rates of return from schooling at an annual rate of 4.62 per cent. This suggests 
that the demand in the labour market has been sluggish and that growth in wage rates 
has not kept up with the supply of workers with more years of schooling.  
A similar story emerges when one looks at the sub periods: 1995–2001 and 2001–04. 
However, the story changes if one looks at the changes that occurred during 2003–04, 
when the per capita labour income increased by 3.28 per cent. Again, productivity 
was the major factor contributing to the growth, but in this case, it contributed a 
positive rate of 1.86 per cent. The labour force participation rate increased by 1.06 per 
cent, while the employment rate increased by 0.79 per cent. This implies that the per 
capita employment rate (i.e., the sum of the labour force participation rate and the 
employment rate) increased by 1.85 per cent. These observations show that the labour 
market turned around very strongly in the 2003–04 period. The rate of return from 
schooling declined at a much slower rate of only 2.63 per cent, despite the fact that 
the years of schooling of the work force increased at a faster rate of 4.49 per cent.  
                                                 
13 Barros and Camargo (1992) and Barros et al. (2004) develop an alternative decomposition 
methodology also applied to Brazilian data. Amadeo et al. (1993) and Amadeo and Camargo 




Table 6 presents the growth rates of money-metric social welfare. The growth rate of 
per capita social welfare was -0.97 per cent in the first period (1995–2001), but 
increased to 0.97 in the second period (2001–02). The factors contributing positively 
to growth in the second period are labour force participation rate, employment rate, 
and productivity. The productivity growth rate of 0.56 per cent is further decomposed 
into three factors: (i) years of schooling, which contributed to an increase in the 
growth rate of productivity by 6.47 percentage points; (ii) average rate of return, 
which contributed to a decline in productivity by 6.71 percentage points; and 
(iii) relative rate of return, which contributed to an increase in the growth rate of 
productivity by 0.81 percentage points.  
Different households enjoy different rates of return from per year of schooling. These 
differences may be caused by a host of variables including age and gender of earners 
in the household, number of earners in the household, sectors of employment by 
workers in the household, educational levels of working members, and so on. Thus, 
relative rates of returns will also change due to a multitude of factors. The changes in 
relative rates of return will not affect the growth rate of the mean labour income, but 
they will affect the social welfare, which is sensitive to changes in relative 
distribution. The empirical results show that the changes in relative rates of return 
have contributed to the increase in the growth rate of social welfare by 0.81 
percentage points. This is a small contribution compared to the decline in welfare that 
is caused by the average rate of return from schooling.  
Table 7 presents gains (and losses) of growth rates due to pro-poor (and anti-poor) 
growth. The labour income became highly pro-poor in the 2001–04 period, 
contributing to gains in the growth rate of 3.02 per cent. In 2003–04, the gain in 
growth rate increased to 12.97 per cent, which indicates a large reduction in 
inequality. Thus, the Brazilian labour market became highly pro-poor in 2003–04. 
Productivity was the most important factor contributing to gains in the growth rate of 
8.9 per cent. Schooling contributed to gains in the growth rate of about 3 percentage 
points. The relative rates of returns from schooling became highly favourable to the 
poor, contributing to gains in the growth rate of 5.85 percentage points.  
Apart from productivity, the other labour market characteristics such as the labour 
force participation rate, the employment rate, and work hours per employed person 
also contributed to a large reduction in inequality during 2001–04.  
8  Contribution of labour and non-labour incomes to pro-poor growth 
The previous section explained the growth rate in labour income in terms of labour 
market characteristics. This section attempts to explain the contributions of both 
labour and non-labour incomes to the pro-poor growth rate of per capita income. As 
pointed out earlier, for the 1995–2004 period, the average growth rate of the total 
income was -0.63 per cent per annum, while labour income grew at an average rate of 
-1.49 per cent, and non-labour income grew at an average rate of 2.64 per annum. 
However, in order to see the contribution of different income sources to total 




gauge the growth rates of different component ratios; it is also necessary to take into 
account the relative weights of each income source in total income. This point also 
applies to pro-poor growth and to the inequality aspects of social welfare. The 
interaction between the high non-linearity of these last two concepts and the additive 
nature of income sources create some difficulties. As a result, the Shapley 
decomposition was used to obtain each income source contribution to pro-poor 
growth. In general, the contribution of a given source to the total growth of a 
particular social welfare concept is positively related to its initial weight and to its 
relative rate of growth in the same period. Table 8 presents the rates of growth and the 
contributions of the labour and non-labour income components to the growth rate of 
total income. 
In 1995, labour income amounted to 82.1 per cent of total income, while the 
remaining 17.9 per cent referred to non-labour. However, the main sources of growth, 
and in particular pro-poor growth sources, relied on the latter. As shown in Table 8, 
the fall of total income of -0.63 per cent per year in the overall 1995–2004 period can 
be decomposed into the adverse labour income contribution of -1.17 per cent per year 
and the contribution of non-labour income of 0.54 per cent per year.  
In turn, differences in pro-poor average annual growth rates are somewhat smaller as 
can be seen from Table 8: total social welfare increased by 0.73 per cent; labour 
income declined by 0.73 per cent and non-labour income increased by 6.30 per cent. 
The weight of labour income in social welfare in the initial period 1995 was 83.9 per 
cent, which is even higher than in the case of average total incomes. Its contribution 
to total social welfare growth in the whole period was -0.60 per cent per annum, i.e., 
about half of its contribution to average income growth. Conversely, non-labour 
income’s share of the social welfare growth was 1.33 per cent per year, making it an 
important factor in determining the positive social welfare trend assumed in the   
1995–2004 period. 
Focusing on individual periods, the contribution of labour income to average annual 
growth changed from -1.02 per cent in 1995–2001 to -1.59 per cent in 2001–04. The 
track record of labour income’s contribution to pro-poor growth is better than its 
contribution to growth per se: -0.74 per cent in 1995–2001 and 0.61 per cent in   
2001–04. Likewise, non-labour’s income share of pro-poor growth also surpasses its 
effects on average income growth in both periods. Note that from 1995 to 2001, non-
labour’s income impact on pro-poor growth rose from 0.84 per cent per year to 2.46 
per cent per year in the 2001–04 period. 
Both labour and non-labour incomes have contributed to a decline in total inequality. 
During the 1995–2001 period, it was the labour income that had a higher contribution 
to the inequality reduction: 0.28 and 0.12 per cent due to the labour and non-labour 
income, respectively. In total, the reduction in inequality amounts to a gain in growth 
rate by only 0.40 per cent. In the second period (2001–04), the gain in growth rate due 
to a fall in inequality was 4.42 per cent, which is substantially greater than the 
corresponding figure for the first period (1995–2001). Of the gain of 4.42 per cent, 
2.20 per cent was contributed by the labour income and 2.22 per cent by the non-
labour income. Thus, the contribution of non-labour income to the inequality 




of labour in total income was much higher than that of non-labour income. This 
suggests that the non-labour income has been more pro-poor than the labour income 
in the second period.  
9  Decomposing the contribution of non-labour incomes 
This section aims to assess the contribution of different types of non-labour income 
sources to the total growth of different welfare concepts, through a decomposition 
scheme of these income sources impacts.  
Special attention is paid to incomes mostly directly affected by social policies, such as 
social security benefits and other non-labour income sources that include cash 
transfers from social programmes and capital income—which turns out to be 
underestimated in PNAD data. The remaining sources of non-labour income such as 
rents and private transfers (remittances, donations, child maintenance support, etc.) 
are part of what is called non-social income. 
Table 9 presents trends in growth rates by non-labour income components. The results 
reveal that while social security has contributed to a rise in inequality during the 
1995–2004 period, the others—including other non-labour income and non-social 
income—have been attributed to a fall in inequality during the same period. 
Interestingly, in the 2001–04 period, all three non-labour income components made a 
positive contribution to the reduction in inequality.  
Table 10 explains the net contributions of each non-labour income component to 
growth patterns and inequality reduction. The results are obtained from the Shapley 
decomposition method. According to the table, other non-labour income has been the 
dominant net contributor to a reduction in inequality over the decade 1995–2004. Its 
net contribution is particularly high in the latter period 2001–04. While non-social 
income appears to play a smaller role in reducing inequality, the net impact of social 
security has been quite important. During the first period (1995–2001), the net effect 
of social security resulted in an increase in inequality. Its net contribution on 
inequality was greater than the net contributions by the other two components. 
Nevertheless, the sum of the net contributions by the other two sources had offset the 
net contribution by social security. As a result, inequality of the non-labour income in 
the first period showed a slight fall of 0.12 per cent. 
9.1   Non-social  income 
Non-social income fell at an average rate of -2.43 per cent per year in the 1995–2004 
period, but it had a sharper decrease in the second period (-3.69 per cent) than the rate 
of -1.23 per cent per year observed in the first period (Table 10). In spite of the 
negative growth, non-social income contributed to a fall in inequality over the decade. 
Its effect on the inequality reduction had been much greater in the first period as 
compared to the second period; 5.64 per cent (in 1995–2001) against 1.72 per cent (in 




Nevertheless, the net contribution of non-social income to overall growth 
performance was rather small given its growth rates. As shown in Table 10, the net 
effect of non-social income on inequality reduction was just 0.11 per cent between 
1995–2004; its magnitude fell to 0.07 per cent in the 2001–04 period from 0.16 per 
cent in the 1995–2001 period. 
9.2   Social security benefits 
Social security is the main component of social income in Brazil, second only to 
labour earnings among all income sources collected by PNAD. In 2004, it amounted 
to 19.55 per cent of all income sources and 92.5 per cent of social income. Social 
security benefits information includes a contributory Pay-as-you-go system and non-
contributory benefits, both of which are subject to discretionary income policies from 
the government. The average growth rate of per capita social security benefits was 
3.25 per cent per year from 1995 to 2004 (Table 9). The average growth rate of social 
security in the first period was much higher than in the second period, 4.69 per cent 
against 0.86 per cent. However, rapid growth in social security has resulted in an 
increase in inequality in Brazil over the 1995–2004 period. Its adverse impact 
amounted to an increase of inequality of 2.13 per cent in the first period. Yet the 
impact of social security income on inequality was reversed when its growth slowed 
down: it led to a reduction in inequality of 3.04 per cent in the second period. A 
similar story emerges from the results reported in Table 10.  
Given the dominance of the public transfer aspect in this income aggregate, it is 
useful to observe the ratio of pro-poor growth to total growth contribution. This can 
be interpreted as an elasticity that shows how many public resources (measured by 
their share of total income) are translated into social welfare, a type of cost-benefit 
analysis. The corresponding elasticity of pro-poor growth with respect to total growth 
(i.e., its fiscal cost), both explained by social security, rose from 0.45 in the   
1995–2001 period to 2.82 in 2001–04, demonstrating a marked improvement in the 
ability of social security benefits in targeting the poorest segments of Brazilian 
society.14 After 1998, the government adopted the new policy of setting higher 
adjustment rates to lower social security benefits. In the entire 1995–2004 period, this 
elasticity amounted to 0.74. This elasticity allows comparing to what extent different 
types of public transfers reach the poor. 
9.3   Other non-labour income 
Other non-labour income sources include very different types of incomes, ranging 
from cash transfer programmes such as the Bolsa-Família to capital income such as 
                                                 
14 One possibility is to divide the information on social security benefits into two regimes: one with 
benefits equal to one minimum wage, the constitutional floor, and the rest. Neri (1998, 2001) 
followed this approach and showed that around 60 per cent of social security benefits amounted to 
one minimum wage, while 80 per cent of social security income accrued to benefits above this 
level. Each additional Real spent adjusting for the social security benefits floor resulted in 4.5 times 




flows derived from interest rates paid on government debt. The pro-poorness aspects 
of these items are expected to be very different, despite the fact that both are not only 
subject to public policy choices but are mostly mediated by the State
15 as well. 
Interest income is largely underestimated by PNAD data, hence this income concept 
is largely explained by public cash transfer programmes such as Bolsa-Família. 
According to Table 9, the other sources of non-labour income aggregate have grown 
at an annual rate of 5.77 per cent in the whole period from 1995 to 2004, presenting 
very diverse patterns across sub-periods. They increased, on average, 0.73 per cent in 
the first period 1995–2001, but this growth accelerated considerably in the 2001–04 
period to 13.26 per cent, reflecting the expansion of the conditional cash transfer 
programmes.  
Table 9 also assesses the impact of other non-labour income source on inequality 
reduction. This income source has attributed to gain in growth rate of 24.17 per cent 
per year in the 1995–2004 period. This is due to a huge reduction in inequality, which 
can be explained by the fact that cash transfers were targeted to the poorest sectors of 
the population. The magnitude of inequality reduction of this income component 
reduced to some extent in the subsequent period as is indicated by falling the 
magnitude of gain in growth rate from 24.77 per cent in the 1995–2001 period to 
21.95 per cent in the 2001–04 period. This suggests that the impact of cash transfers 
became slightly less pro-poor in the second period. 
As we have seen, to measure the contribution of the expansion of cash transfer 
programmes from 2001 onwards, it is not sufficient to gauge its relatively high growth 
rates. Instead, its relative weight among different non-labour income sources must 
also be considered. In Table 10, the net contribution of other non-labour income to 
total growth per year during the 1995–2004, 1995–2001, and 2001–04 periods was 
0.06, 0.01, and 0.16, respectively. This means that the role of cash transfers to explain 
income growth is quite small. But by the same token, the impacts of other income 
sources on the fiscal budget deficit were also relatively mild.  
According to Table 10, the net contribution of other non-labour income source to 
inequality reduction outweighs the contributions made by the other two income 
components. In the overall 1995–2004 period, it was responsible for 0.82 per cent of the 
fall in inequality. Similarly, its net contribution was 0.37 per cent of the fall in 
inequality in the 1995–2001 period, and then increased to 1.84 per cent of the inequality 
fall. This indicates that other non-labour income sources constitute a key determinant of 
the reduction in inequality in Brazil over the period.  
The elasticity of the contribution to pro-poor growth of a particular income transfer 
with respect to its contribution to total growth is useful to guide policies aimed at the 
poorest groups in the Brazilian society. The corresponding other non-labour income 
sources elasticity was 14.66 during the 1995–2004 period, which is much higher than 
the one found for social security benefits. Each percentage point in the share of 
government transfers in this item bought 19.8 times more pro-poor growth in other 
                                                 




non-labour income than in social security benefits, this result is consistent with the 
evaluation of conditional cash transfers done in Brazil and elsewhere (Lindert et al., 
2005; Barros, 2005; Hoffman, 2005; Soares, 2006; Bourguignon et al., 2003; Skoufias 
et al., 2001; Coady and Skoufias, 2004; Suplicy, 2002).16  
In sum, other non-labour income sources have played a dominant role in achieving the 
pro-poor pattern of growth in Brazil, while having a minor contribution to total 
growth and to the Brazilian fiscal accounts. It seems that government cash transfers 
programmes are so well targeted that even with relatively small costs they had a large 
impact on the poor people’s living conditions. 
10 Conclusions 
This paper makes two important contributions to the literature. One contribution is its 
proposal for a new measure of pro-poor growth. This new measure provides the 
linkage between growth rates in the mean income and income inequality. In this 
sense, growth is defined as pro-poor (or anti-poor) if there is a gain (or loss) in growth 
rate due to a decrease (or increase) in inequality. The other contribution is to develop 
a decomposition methodology exploring linkages between three dimensions; growth 
patterns, labour market performances, and social policies. Through this 
decomposition, the growth in per capita labour income is explained in terms of four 
components: the employment rate, hours of work in the labour market, the labour 
force participation rate, and productivity. Using the Shapely decomposition 
methodology, the paper first assesses the relative contributions of labour and non-
labour incomes to pro-poor pattern of growth in per capita income. The non-labour 
income consists of social and non-social incomes so the paper demonstrates how the 
Shapely decomposition can be utilized to capture the contributions of social security 
income and governments targeted cash transfers on the pro-poor patterns of growth.  
For empirical analysis, the study has used the Brazilian National Household Survey 
(PNAD) from 1995 to 2004. The paper has analysed the evolution of Brazilian social 
indicators based on per capita income exploring links with adverse labour market 
performance and social policy changes, in particular the expansion of targeted cash 
transfers and devising more pro-poor social security benefits. The description of these 
social indicators depends on two main dimensions: (i) who was affected by shocks 
perceived in the labour market and changes observed in social policies? In particular, 
to what extent did these innovations affect the poorest segments of the Brazilian 
society more?; and (ii) to what extent did the crisis affect labour income vs. other 
income sources such as official cash transfers, social security benefits, or private 
incomes?  
                                                 
16 The cash transfer elasticity of pro-poor growth decreased from 38 in the 1995–2001 period to 12.5 
per cent in 2001–04, showing a loss in the pro-poorness of cash transfers but in the last period it is 




The general answer to these questions is that the labour earnings of the upper 
segments of Brazilian society were the epicentre of the economic crisis. Although per 
capita income fell during the 1995–2004 period, it cannot be referred to as a ‘poverty 
crisis’. While labour markets were quite adversely affected, incomes derived from 
social security and other government transfers played a crucial role in cushioning the 
consequences of macro shocks observed, specifically among the poorest segments of 
the Brazilian society. 
Globalization can make a significant contribution to productivity increase and hence 
economic growth, but it also makes economies more vulnerable to external shocks. 
The Brazilian experience presented in the paper shows that government social policies 
can play an important role in protecting the poor from external shocks which 
otherwise can have a devastating impact on the living conditions of the poor.  
Annex: pesquisa nacional de amostras a domicilio–PNAD 
We describe here PNAD characteristics, the deflation procedures used and compare 
PNAD per capita incomes with GDP per capita trends. PNAD is an annual household 
survey performed in the third quarter that interviews 100,000 households every year. 
It has been conducted by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística –IBGE 
since 1967. This survey has extensive information on personal and occupational 
characteristics of individuals. The PNAD has detailed information on the possession 
of durable goods and on housing conditions since it first started. It underwent a major 
revision between 1990 and 1992 increasing the number of the questionnaire from 60 
to 130 questions. The new questionnaire, available from 1992 onwards, has 
information on the value spend in rent and ten separate questions on income sources 
were included and kept constant in the questionnaire. In Sections 8 and 9 of income 
decomposition we have labelled these items as follows: (i) labour income, i.e., main 
labour income and other labour income. The non-labour components are arranged in 
three additional groups: (ii) social security income, which includes main retirement 
benefit, other retirement benefits, main pension, and other pensions; (iii) Non-social 
income, which includes private transfers and rents. (iv) Other non-labour incomes, 
this is the residual that includes mainly public transfers associated with conditional 
cash transfers (Bolsa Familia, Bolsa Escola etc.), unemployment insurance but also 
financial incomes that are underestimated.  
Here we have used the Consumer Price Index in the deflation procedures adopted. 
Although there are year to year differences between PNAD per capita incomes and 
GDP growth rates, the trends in the 1995 to 2006 period are basically the same; 1,16 
per cent for the former and 1,00 per cent for the latter. We decided to restrict the 
analysis to the post 1994 period in order to avoid the imprecision associated with the 
deflation process during the sharp inflationary transitions often observed before this 
period. The problem is not only that the choice of a specific price index involves 
arbitrary decisions that affect the average level of real incomes. Fluctuations in 
inflation also introduce problems in the measurement of inequality firstly, because 
nominal incomes are received at different time periods. Secondly, since real incomes 




cash holdings specifically by the poor who do not have access to indexed financial 
accounts, yet this effect is not captured in standard household surveys. Finally, and 
most importantly, when nominal income adjustments are not synchronized, inequality 
of monthly earnings (an indicator traditionally used in Brazil) is biased upward in an 
inflationary spiral.17 In sum, the advantage of using the post 1994 period is to avoid 
any questionnaire changes, second is to avoid sharp inflationary movements and 
currency changes. We have also shown that PNAD per capita incomes and GDP per 
capita present the same long run trends.  
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Growth rates of per capita real income and social welfare 
Period   Actual growth rate  Pro-poor growth rate  Gain(+)/loss(-) of growth
1995–96  1.59  -5.95  -7.54 
1996–97  0.65  4.42  3.77 
1997–98  0.97  5.07  4.10 
1998–99  -5.15  -2.53  2.63 
1999–2001  0.76  -2.17  -2.94 
2001–02  0.11  8.98  8.87 
2002–03  -6.12  -9.64  -3.52 
2003–04  3.56  14.11  10.55 
1995–2004  -0.63  0.73  1.36 
1995–2001  -0.30  0.10  0.40 
2001–04  -1.35  3.07  4.42 




Period   Headcount ratio  Poverty gap ratio  Severity of poverty 
1995  29.37  12.80  7.69 
1996  29.23  13.31  8.26 
1997  29.24  13.00  7.98 
1998  27.83  12.28  7.40 
1999  28.81  12.58  7.53 
2001  28.28  12.75  7.84 
2002  27.39  11.78  6.95 
2003  28.19  12.32  7.51 
2004  26.04  10.87  6.36 
Annual growth rates 
1995–2001  -0.68  -0.54  -0.50 
2001–04  -2.20  -4.32  -5.52 
1995–2004  -1.00  -1.46  -1.76 
Source:  Authors’ calculation based on PNAD. 





Growth rates of per capita labour income 
Period   Actual growth rate  Pro-poor growth rate  Gain(+)/loss(-) of growth
1995–96  1.16  -7.21  -8.37 
1996–97  0.33  3.71  3.38 
1997–98  -1.66  3.97  5.63 
1998–99  -6.23  -3.38  2.84 
1999–2001  0.39  -3.54  -3.93 
2001–02  -0.58  7.24  7.82 
2002–03  -7.15  -15.20  -8.05 
2003–04  3.28  16.24  12.97 
1995–2004  -1.49  -0.73  0.76 
1995–2001  -1.30  -0.97  0.32 
2001–04  -2.05  0.97  3.02 
Source:  Authors’ calculation based on PNAD. 
 
Table 4 
Growth rates of per capita non-labour income 
Period  Actual growth rate  Pro-poor growth rate  Gain(+)/loss(-) of growth
1995–96  3.56  0.95  -2.61 
1996–97  2.10  7.63  5.53 
1997–98  11.77  11.66  -0.11 
1998–99  -1.13  1.01  2.14 
1999–2001  2.09  3.42  1.33 
2001–02  2.51  14.53  12.02 
2002–03  -2.69  5.06  7.76 
2003–04  4.48  9.18  4.71 
1995–2004  2.64  6.30  3.66 
1995–2001  3.69  5.20  1.51 
2001–04  1.02  9.14  8.12 





Explaining growth rates of per capita real income 
Explanatory factors  1995–2004  1995–2001  2001–04  2003–04 
Labour force participation rate  0.73  0.48  1.27  1.06 
Employment rate  -0.34  -0.66  0.07  0.79 
Hours of work per person 
employed  -0.25  -0.07  -0.72  -0.43 
Productivity  -1.63  -1.05  -2.67  1.86 
— Years of schooling  2.99  2.34  4.04  4.49 
— Average rate of returns per 
year of schooling  -4.62  -3.38  -6.71  -2.63 
— Relative rate of returns per 
year of schooling  -0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.00 
Total labour income  -1.49  -1.30  -2.05  3.28 
Source:  Authors’ calculation based on PNAD. 
 
Table 6 
Explaining pro-poor growth rate of money-metric social welfare 
Explanatory factors  1995–2004 1995–2001 2001–04  2003–04 
Labour force participation rate  0.41  0.19  1.24  2.69 
Employment rate  -0.68  -1.14  0.17  2.35 
Hours of work per person employed  -0.41  -0.21  -1.01  0.44 
Productivity  -0.05  0.18  0.56  10.76 
— Years of schooling  3.95  2.80  6.47  7.54 
— Average rate of returns per year of 
schooling  -4.62  -3.38  -6.71  -2.63 
— Relative rate of returns per year of 
schooling  0.61  0.77  0.81  5.85 
Total labour income  -0.73  -0.97  0.97  16.24 
Source:  Authors’ calculation based on PNAD. 





Explaining gains and losses in growth rates 
Explanatory factors  1995–2004 1995–2001 2001–04  2003–04 
Labour force participation rate  -0.32  -0.29  -0.03  1.63 
Employment rate  -0.34  -0.48  0.11  1.56 
Hours of work per person employed  -0.17  -0.14  -0.29  0.87 
Productivity  1.58  1.23  3.23  8.90 
— Years of schooling  0.97  0.46  2.43  3.05 
— Average rate of returns per year of 
schooling  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
— Relative rate of returns per year of 
schooling  0.61  0.77  0.81  5.85 
Labour income  0.76  0.32  3.02  12.97 
Source:  Authors’ calculation based on PNAD. 
 
Table 8 
Growth rates and contributions to growth rates by income components 
Period 














1995–2004  -1.49  2.64  -0.63  -1.17  0.54  -0.63 
1995–2001  -1.30  3.69  -0.30  -1.02  0.72  -0.30 
2001–04  -2.05  1.02  -1.35  -1.59  0.24  -1.35 
Pro-poor growth 
1995–2004  -0.73  6.30  0.73  -0.60  1.33  0.73 
1995–2001  -0.97  5.20  0.10  -0.74  0.84  0.10 
2001–04  0.97  9.14  3.07  0.61  2.46  3.07 
Inequality 
1995–2004  0.76  3.66  1.36  0.57  0.79  1.36 
1995–2001  0.32  1.51  0.40  0.28  0.12  0.40 
2001–04  3.02  8.12  4.42  2.20  2.22  4.42 
Source:  Authors’ calculation based on PNAD. 





Growth rates by non-labour components 
Period  Labour 
income 
Non-labour income  Total  
income  Social security Other non-labour Non-social income 
  Actual growth 
1995–2004  -1.49  3.25  5.77  -2.43  -0.63 
1995–2001  -1.30  4.69  0.73  -1.23  -0.30 
2001–04  -2.05  0.86  13.26  -3.69  -1.35 
  Pro-poor growth 
1995–2004  -0.73  3.12  29.94  1.43  0.73 
1995–2001  -0.97  2.56  25.50  4.41  0.10 
2001–04  0.97  3.90  35.21  -1.97  3.07 
  Inequality 
1995–2004  0.76  -0.13  24.17  3.86  1.36 
1995–2001  0.32  -2.13  24.77  5.64  0.40 
2001–04  3.02  3.04  21.94  1.72  4.42 
Source:  Authors’ calculation based on PNAD. 
Table 10 
Explaining contributions of growth rates by non-labour income components  
(based on Shapely decomposition) 




Social security Other non-labour Non-social income 
  Actual growth 
1995–2004  -1.17  0.54  0.06  -0.07  -0.63 
1995–2001  -1.02  0.75  0.01  -0.04  -0.30 
2001–04  -1.59  0.17  0.16  -0.10  -1.35 
  Pro-poor growth 
1995–2004  -0.60  0.40  0.88  0.04  0.73 
1995–2001  -0.74  0.34  0.38  0.12  0.10 
2001–04  0.61  0.48  2.00  -0.03  3.07 
  Inequality 
1995–2004  0.57  -0.14  0.82  0.11  1.36 
1995–2001  0.28  -0.41  0.37  0.16  0.40 




Source:  Authors’ calculation based on PNAD. 
Figure 1 
Growth rates of per capita real income and social welfare 
 
Source: Compiled  by  authors. 
 
Figure 2 
Actual and pro-poor growth rates of per capita labour income 
 
Source: Compiled  by  authors. 
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Source: Compiled  by  authors. 
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